for trying to determine the possibility of the constitution of the double-intentionality of absolute 24 consciousness (Section III). I will then take up this suggestion, and note how the "striving" 25 character of protention, and the two distinct modes (i.e., clarifying and confirming) of bringing to 26 intuition that protention makes possible, are both unique to protention and necessary for the 27 constitution of the double-intentionality of absolute consciousness, thereby finally confirming 28 that protention is more than an inverse retention (Section IV). I will end by drawing out the 29 implications of this positive account of protention for our understanding of retention and its 30 relationship to absolute consciousness. This conclusion will suggest that several other key 31 aspects of phenomenological thought should also be re-evaluated in light of this positive account 32 of protention, and that such a re-evaluation will have consequences for fields as diverse as ethics, 33 politics and psychology. will also have a protention of E, `E, that anticipates the next instant E as not-yet-in-the-now (Hua 51 X, 77, 373), such that at the next instant, E, I will sense E, have a retention of D, Ed, and a 52 on the change of terminology and how it relates to the development of Husserl's account of timeconsciousness in Hua X, see Brough 1972, 314-15. secondary retention of C, Ec, 5 along with a protention of F, `F, and so on (see Hua X, 28; Zahavi 53 1999, 66) . 54
This "temporality" of consciousness is metaphorically called "flow" (Hua X, 75). 6 
55
Within this flow, protention is understood as retention "turned upside down" (Hua X, 55-56), 56 that is, retention in the other direction. Thought in terms of the movement of the flow relative to 57 the now-point of the primal impression, this is perhaps understandable. But is it correct? To 58 answer this, we must turn to a more in-depth study of the individual acts that make up Husserl's 59 theory of time, and specifically, in line with the aim of this paper, to protention. However, while 60
Husserl discusses primary impression and retention at length, protention does not get much more 61 than a few passing mentions in these lectures. Given that protention is claimed to be like 62 retention but in the other direction, this might not prove to be too problematic, if we can get an 63 adequate understanding of retention. Therefore, let us turn first to retention. 64
II. Retention and Absolute Consciousness 66
5 That is, a retention (Ec) of the retention (Dc) of C. 6 William James uses the metaphor of a rainbow before a waterfall to illustrate the flow: while the rainbow remains constant, the material that makes up the rainbow, the individual particles of water that reflect sunlight and hence give off the appearance of the rainbow, are constantly changing, constantly moving, as the water continues to flow; see James 1981, 593 . For a more thorough explanation of the relation between Husserl's and James' theories of timeconsciousness, see Cobb-Stevens 1998.
Initially, Husserl thought that retention enabled consciousness to keep past moments in 67 the present consciousness, 7 and he struggled with the question of how retention was able to 68 achieve this. In lecture notes from 1904-1905 that make up the bulk of the first portion of 69 Husserliana X, Husserl still believed that retention functioned on the model of content and 70 apprehension: the shading-off or adumbration functions as the content that is apprehended by the 71 present consciousness as just past. However, Husserl would soon realize that this model of 72 retention is unsatisfactory, as apprehension-content can be the content for only one apprehension, 73 and therefore the content that is present to consciousness at A can only be used to apprehend the 74 now-phase of A. In order for a retention to be understood as a retention of a past moment, it must 75 already be modified. In being aware of the past as past, therefore, retention is a modifying 76 consciousness, that is, a consciousness through and through. However, Husserl himself raises questions about retention's ability to achieve this 95 double-intentionality. In trying to make sense of the role that retentions play in constituting the 96 "unitary stream of experience," Husserl claims that we must take into account the fact that every 97 retention "contains expectation-intentions whose fulfillment leads to the present" (Hua X, 52). 98
Hence, it is the concept of fulfillment that is able to "tie" retentions to the present of the stream 99 of consciousness, and this because of the presence of protention: "Every process that constitutes 100 its object originally is animated by protentions that emptily constitute what is coming as coming, 101 that catch it and bring it toward fulfillment" (52). It is the fulfillment of these emptily constituted 102 protentions that we are made aware of in retention (52). 103
Unfortunately, Husserl does not develop this intriguing notion in any more detail in Hua 104 X. He does, however, develop it in more detail in other texts of this time (c. 1917). 9 In 105 addressing it, Husserl starts to move away from the notion of protention as merely an inverse 106 retention, and begins to develop a positive account of protention. In the "Bernau Manuscripts" of 107 1917-1918, Husserl begins to realize that protention, in its capacity for fulfillment, promises to 108 be a more fertile ground for a phenomenological analysis of absolute consciousness (Hua 109 XXXIII, 225-226). 10 The notion of fulfillment gives Husserl a stronger account of how absolute 110 consciousness is self-constituting, one that answers how we can come to know the self-111 constituting character of absolute consciousness. In order to fulfill a protention, an act must be 112 aware, not just of the constitution of the present object, but also of the constitution of the 113 preceding act anticipating fulfillment. Hence, there is a two-fold coincidence between protended 114 and present moments: first, there is a coincidence between the previous protentional intention 115 and the primal presentation (Hua XXXIII, 25); second, there is a coincidence between that 116 toward which both the protention and the primal presentation are directed. The first of these 117
Husserl describes under the rubric of "general fulfillment," and the second under "particular 118 fulfillment" (Hua XXXIII, 29-30). General fulfillment plays a role in the self-constitution of the 119 primal stream, thought along the lines of the stream's "self-relatedness" (Selbstbezogenheit, Hua 120 XXXIII, 207). Particular fulfillment plays a role in the constitution of the immanent temporal 121 9 § 24, from which the above quotes from Hua X, 52 were taken, was composed at a later date than most of the rest of the first portion of Hua X. In being written specifically for the compiled edition prepared by Edith Stein, § 24 was written in 1917; see Boehm's note on Hua X, 52;
Husserl 1991, 54 note 36.
objects.
11 Hence, the notion of fulfillment is able to explain why the double-intentionality needed 122 to make absolute consciousness self-constituting is united in protention in way that could not be 123 so easily explained in retention. Let us examine this idea of fulfillment in more detail. reference to the L Manuscripts rather than Hua XXXIII when using translations from those scholars, in keeping with their own preference for the L manuscripts. 13 To go back to our above example: if a moment E contains an impression of E, a retention of D, Ed, a secondary retention of C, Ec, and a protention of F, `F, then we must understand each of these moments, and not just `F, as protentional: just as `F protends its givenness in the next instant as F, so too E protends its givenness in the next instant as Fe, Ed protends its givenness as there is no need of another act beyond the coincidence to unite the past to the future (Hua 146 XXXIII, 27). While the sixth Logical Investigation seems to indicate that consciousness of 147 fulfillment requires three elements (namely a consciousness that must be fulfilled, a 148 consciousness that fulfills, and a synthesizing consciousness that ties the first two together such 149 that one can be conscious of the fulfillment), the position that Husserl describes in the Bernau 150
Manuscripts is that, because of the essential role of protention, this third element (which quickly 151 would lead to a problem of infinite regress) is no longer necessary. As Kortooms describes it: the 152 "consciousness that fulfills is at the same time conscious of itself as being a consciousness that 153 fulfills. Such self-consciousness is possible because the consciousness that fulfills itself retains 154 the protentional directedness toward fulfillment that belonged to the preceding phase of 155 consciousness" (Kortooms 2002, 162) . Husserl is thereby able to avoid the problem of infinite 156 regress, as there is no longer recourse to an 'external' synthesizing consciousness beyond the 157 descriptions of retention in Hua XXXIII, 34-35; these are drawn out in diagram form in Kortooms 2002, 167, 168. fulfillment.
14 This self-related fulfillment is continuously occurring in general fulfillment, in 158 which protention protends the mode of givenness of what is to come: E protends its being given 159 in the next instant as a retention, Fe, Ed protends its being given in the next instant as a 160 secondary retention, Fd, and `F protends its being given in the next instant as F. But again, the 161 mutual implication of protention and retention is at work, as, conversely, Fe retains the 162 protentional directedness of E as well as its fulfillment, F retains the protentional directedness of 163 `F and its fulfillment, and Fd retains the protentional directedness of Ed and its fulfillment (as 164 well as the protentional directedness of D and its fulfillment in Ed, etc.). This complex 165 relationship between protention and retention is able to do away with talk of primal impression: 15 166 rather than protending or retaining a particular sensation-content, protentions protend retentions, 167
and retentions retain protentions (as well as the retention of previous protentions). 16 As Husserl 168 puts it: 169 14 As was the case in the early accounts of internal time consciousness (e.g., when Husserl was still employing the content-apprehension schema; see above), and as would be the case if he maintained the notion of fulfillment introduced in the sixth of the Logical Investigations. 15 That it is able to do away with such talk does not mean that Husserl always consistently does so. The talk of primal impression will remain intermittently throughout the middle and later writings. Lanei Rodemeyer would prefer to replace talk of primal impression with that of "moment of actualization," which she claims is less likely to reify the idea of a "now-point," which has always been an idealized abstraction for Husserl (see Hua X, 40; and above, note 3); and whether or not the duration of the object may cease and when it may cease, and retention, which is bound" (Husserl's marginal note added to Hua X, 297; Husserl 1991, 309 note 42). 18 The retention of previous retentions and protentions would also border on infinite. However, the openness of protention marks an essential difference from the necessarily "bound" nature of retention (see note on Hua X, 297, and note 17 above). This will be discussed in greater detail in Section IV below.
object. 19 The limit of the intuitive domain is what Husserl calls the zero of intuition (Hua 208 XXXIII, 227). This limit prevents the problem of infinite regress because of the finite nature of 209 intuition: we cannot intuit an infinite number of things. In the domain of non-intuitive 210 differentiation, however, we can theoretically distinguish an infinite number of different points, 211 that is, an infinite number of potential protentions and retentions attaching to every momentary 212 phase of consciousness. This domain is limited again by the point at which consciousness falls 213 away, a second zero. Here, however, the limit is an open point without differences (Hua XXXIII, 214 227-228), that is, the point in which there exists, theoretically, an infinite number of points that 215 consciousness cannot practically differentiate (e.g., all the future protentions mentioned above). 216
There is, then, a certain potential infinity in both the protentional and retentional directions. 217
However, this potential infinity does not succumb to the problem of infinite regress because no 218 one, and certainly not Husserl, has claimed that consciousness can retain or protend over an 219 infinite span of time. Indeed, quite the opposite-the period of retention and protention is 220 severely limited, tied, as it is, to the "primal impression. But it is not accidental that the discussion of fulfillment occurs at the same time as 231
Husserl increases his focus on protention. There is something essentially different about 232 protention that gives it a unique function in fulfillment, and hence a unique function in absolute 233 consciousness and everything this makes possible in phenomenology. What makes protention 234 intrinsically different from retention is the "striving" character of protention (Hua XI, 73). 235
Husserl makes clear that the striving characteristic of protention is a passive directedness, a 236 "passive intentionality" (Hua XI, 76), with which the ego has no active involvement (Hua XI, 237 86). This "striving" character, Husserl claims, belongs intrinsically to protention, and protention 238 alone: while retention may acquire this striving character, it does not intrinsically possess it. In 239 other words, though we can "cast a backward turning glance" toward the past, this is a 240 subsequent act which is distinct from retention, and we must "clearly differentiate between the 241 direction of the egoic regard, and the direction in perception itself that already takes place prior 242 to the apprehending regard" (Hua XI, 74). 22 Indeed, Husserl seems to say that an intentionally-243 directed retention ceases to be retention; rather, once "awakened" by a directed consciousness, it 244 "should already be characterized as a remembering" (Hua XI, 80) rather than as a retaining. 23 To 245 be directed toward the past, then, is to be remembering, not retaining. Retention retains the past 246 in a temporality that is in the present, always moving toward the future. Hence, retention is not 247 directed toward the past. 248
Because it is not directed, then, retention does not bear the same necessary relation to 249 intentionality as does protention. Protention, and protention alone, becomes a necessary aspect of 250 intentionality: without protention, there would be no intentionality. 24 The openness to 251 temporality that goes beyond its own fulfillment which is constitutive of protention is the same 252 directedness beyond immediate fulfillment that characterizes intentionality. In fact, Husserl will 253 say that intentions and expectations "are two sides of one and the same thing" (Ms. L I 16, 5b; as 254 translated in Rodemeyer 2003, 137) . The directedness of protention, then, is a necessary aspect 255 22 All quotations from this volume are from Husserl 2001b. 23 This seems to be in line with some of the later texts from Hua X, e.g., Text n. 54 (which is dated no earlier than the end of 1911): "We rather call it the retention of the earlier primal sensation, when it is a question of a consciousness in the original flow of the modifications of sensation; otherwise we call it a reproduction of the earlier sensation. We must adhere to this distinction consistently" (Hua X, 377). of intentionality. 25 It also makes possible the apperception, and hence the constitution, of objects. 256
The movement beyond the (fulfilled) presence at work in protention opens up to me the 257 possibility of other perspectives that are not my own, enables me to move beyond the merely 258 present to apperceive objects in their combination of presence and absence (Hua XI, 190). 26 In terms of the previous section, we here see the "directedness" of protention as bearing on fulfillment in both its general and its particular functions. This "directedness" alone is not enough for apperception, however. A more complete account of apperception would need to augment our current analysis of protention with an analysis of expectation as it occurs in passive syntheses such as association. The relationship between protention and expectation would then need to be explained. For our current purpose of distinguishing protention from retention, however, such an augmentation is not necessary. is necessary for absolute consciousness. 27 This unity is possible because of a distinction in 266 modes of bringing to intuition that marks the second essential difference between protention and 267 retention. In protention, there are two distinct modes of bringing to intuition: the clarifying 268 (picturing) mode, and the confirming (fulfilling) mode (Hua XI, 79-80). The first of these modes 269 seeks to clarify, picture, or pre-figure the intended objective sense: because the "generality of 270 expectation is always relatively determinate or indeterminate" (Hua XI, 79), it is necessary to 271 determine more closely (Hua XI, 80) the field of possibility for the intended and expected object. 272
Protention, then, enables expectation 28 to clarify the intended object (specifically, its objective 273 sense), and in this way it can be considered "disclosive" (Hua XI, 79). Here, expectation fills 274 some of the emptiness of the intended object so that the intended object can coincide with a 275 27 Husserl is adamant that retention does not arise on the basis of such an associative awakening that proceeds from the primal impression (Hua XI, 77). Though retentions may be able to acquire the associative awakening that belongs intrinsically to protention, this happens only occasionally, and only subsequently, that is, secondarily-it is not intrinsic to retention (Hua XI, 77). While this may seem to make Husserl's position similar to that of Brentano, whom Husserl critiques in § § 3-6 of Hua X (see also Kortooms 2002, 28-38) , Husserl clearly claims that his position is distinct from, and does not succumb to the critiques that he himself leveled against, the position of Brentano; see Hua XI, 77 ff. 28 On the distinction between protention and expectation, see Hua XI, 125-129. Briefly, protention is a "synthetically constituted form in which all other possible syntheses must participate" (Hua XI, 125). Association is one of these other possible syntheses. What protention is to internal time-consciousness, expectation is to association and passive constitution: the subject's mode of relating to the future within that specific type of constituting consciousness.
confirming-fulfilling intuition in a synthesis. The second mode of bringing to intuition, then, is 276 "the specific fulfillment of intuition" that is the "synthesis with an appropriate perception" (79). 277
Here, "the merely expected object is identified with the actually arriving object, as fulfilling the 278 expectation" (79). Hence, these two modes of bringing to intuition help us see even more clearly 279 how the type of fulfillment necessary for the self-constitution of the absolute stream of 280 consciousness is possible. 281
Husserl is again adamant, though, that these two modes of bringing to intuition occur 282 only in protention. In retention, the problem is twofold. . 29 We have already seen, though, that for Husserl these "awakened" retentions are not, in 287 essence, retentions. And even if we agree to take these modified and "awakened" retentions as 288 the subject of our analysis, "we will realize immediately that the process of bringing to intuition 289 as a clarifying process, and the process of bringing to intuition as a confirming one, are not 290 sharply distinguished here, as is the case with protentions" (80). In the case of retentions, the 291 synthesis that clarifies the sense of the intended object is simultaneously the synthesis that 292 confirms the object as the fulfillment of the clarified intention. Though remembering can be a 293 "picturing" or clarifying, "it cannot merely be a picturing; rather it is simultaneously and 294 necessarily self-giving and thus fulfilling-confirming" (Hua XI, 81). This, perhaps, is another 295 way of marking the "essential difference" that Husserl finds between protention and retention 296 We can see, then, that protention is, and must be, distinct from retention. It is not merely 302 an inverse retention, but is instead characterized by essential differences that help explain the 303 possibility of the self-constitution of the stream of absolute consciousness. Protention, and 304 protention alone, is necessarily directed (and thereby intentional) and able to bring to intuition 305 both a clarifying and a confirming synthesis (and thereby make possible the knowledge of 306 fulfillment). Hence, not only is protention essentially different from retention, but protention has 307 a key role to play in phenomenology. of retention internal to that account. Doing so will help us begin to see the importance that this 317 new account of protention will have in phenomenology.
As discussed in sections I and II above, Husserl's account of internal time-consciousness 319 is necessary to establish what Husserl will call "absolute consciousness," and hence avoid 320 problems of infinite regress that plagued the earlier accounts of time-consciousness put forward 321 by Meinong and others. Retention was the key to establishing absolute consciousness, as its 322 double-intentionality enabled one act to be simultaneously self-constituting and constitutive of 323 objects. However, our new account of protention gives us reason to question this move. 324
Specifically, it causes us to question to what extent retention can be described as "intentional" at 325 all, let alone doubly-intentional. 326
The problem arises from the lack of directedness or striving that marks one of the 327 essential differences between retention and protention. If retention is not directed, if it does not 328 strive in the way that protention does, it is then difficult to conceive of how it can be intentional, 329
as an essential aspect of intentionality is its being necessarily directed. 30 Therefore, it is difficult 330 to conceive of how retention can be intentional, a problem that Husserl himself noticed: 331 "retentions, as they arise in their originality, have no intentional character" (Hua XI, 77) though, 332 as discussed earlier, this "does not rule out that in certain circumstances and in their own way 333 they can assume this intentional character later" (Hua XI, 77). But if retentions are not 334 intentional, as Husserl himself says, then surely they cannot be doubly intentional, as Husserl 335 also states. 31 Yet, the double-intentionality of retention was key to establishing the need for, and 336 30 See Fink's citation of Husserl in note 25 above. 31 My thanks to Osborne Wiggins for pointing this inconsistency out to me, and to the participants of the 38 th annual conference of the International Husserl Circle, whose comments on an earlier draft of this paper were very helpful in developing the conclusions that I am now putting forth.
viability of, Husserl's account of absolute consciousness. Hence, if one denies that (double) 337 intentionality, one seems to lose the justification for Husserl's discussion of absolute 338 consciousness, and the possibility of transcendental phenomenology itself is called into question. 339
But this extreme conclusion need not be reached. Rather, a clarification of our terms at 340 this point helps us avoid this damning consequence while at the same time deepening our 341 understanding of internal time-consciousness, in general, and retention, more specifically. This 342 can be done by paying close attention to the "fundamental stratification" of cognitive life (Hua 343 XI, 64). The key distinction at work in this stratification is that between "modal modifications of 344 passive doxa, of passive intentions of expectation, their inhibitions passively accruing to them, 345 and the like" (Hua XI, 52), on the one hand, and, on the other, the "spontaneous activity of the 346 ego (the activity of intellectus agens) that puts into play the peculiar accomplishments of the 347 ego" (Hua XI, 64), for example in judicative decisions. Husserl is clear that the latter position-348 taking of the ego presuppose the passive doxa of the first level (Hua XI, 53). For our purposes, 349 this stratification enables us to distinguish between conscious acts comprising the active level of 350 the ego, and that which passively constitutes those conscious acts. 32 Retention and protention 351 belong properly in the passive group, and as such cannot be considered acts, properly speaking. 352 Therefore, retention cannot possibly be the act that is doubly-intentional. Rather, retention and 353 protention (that is, internal time-consciousness) make it possible that acts can be doubly-354 32 This "passive" level of constitution can itself be divided into two distinct realms of constitution: the "lawful regularity of immanent genesis that constantly belongs to consciousness in general" (Hua XI, 117), of which association is the prime example; and, the "universal, formal framework... in which all other possible syntheses must participate" (Hua XI, 125) that is internal time-consciousness. intentional; retention and protention are necessary constitutive factors of the acts of 355 consciousness, which themselves constitute the objects of our experience. 356
This clarification helps us adequately understand the place of internal time consciousness 357 in Husserl's thought. It also helps us understand that retention-which is not yet an act-cannot 358 possibly be intentional in the standard sense, namely as consciousness of (an object). 33 Rather, it 359 is more accurate to say that conscious acts are able to be intentional because of retention and 360 protention, that is, because of internal time-consciousness. Within internal time-consciousness, it 361 is protention that strives for fulfillment, 34 and hence protention is more easily connected with 362 intentionality, including the double-intentionality that makes possible absolute consciousness. As 363 such, we can now fully appreciate Husserl's suggestion in Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das 364
Zeitbewusstsein (1917/1918 ) that protention might prove to be a more fruitful area of analysis for 365 a phenomenological inquiry into absolute consciousness than is retention (Hua XXXIII, 225-6). 366
The implications of the above are twofold: 367 1. Retention and protention are not something we do: because they are not acts, but are 368 constitutive of acts, retention and protention are not something that we consciously "do." It is, 369 therefore, difficult, at best, and inaccurate, at worst, to talk of retaining, e.g., a perception of the 370 color red. Rather, we perceive the color red, and are able to do so because of protention and 371 retention. What exactly is retained, then, becomes difficult to discuss, as it is all too easy to 372 33 There can be no object on the level of passive constitution, as only the categorial object is an perceived cannot be that which is retained, as that which is retained is necessary for perception to 374 occur. With this caveat in place, it would seem that both the hyletic datum of "red-ness" and the 375 protentional directedness of each impression, directed again both to the object (special 376 fulfillment) and to the different modes of that object's being given to consciousness (general 377 fulfillment), are retained. They are retained, not in the act of retention, but in the act of 378 perception (here, specifically, the perception of something red). This distinction between acts of 379 consciousness and that which constitutes those acts (including internal time-consciousness) must 380 be rigorously maintained. 381
It is especially, though not exclusively, because of protention that our acts can be doubly-382
intentional: This conclusion runs contrary to Husserl's claims that retention is doubly intentional 383 (see Hua X, 380-381). As such, we should not affirm it too quickly. Protention and retention, 384 taken together as internal time-consciousness, enable us to both perceive objects and conceive of 385 ourselves as conscious of objects. 35 Hence, internal time-consciousness enables us to be doubly-386 intentional in the way necessary for absolute consciousness. However, within internal time-387 consciousness, we can see that it is protention that strives for fulfillment, both because it is 388 inherently directed and because it differentiates between clarifying and confirming modes of 389 bringing to intuition. Hence, it is protention that is tied more closely to intentionality in general 390 and, by extension, to double-intentionality as well. Of course, this is not to say that retention has 391 no role to play in intentionality, as retention and protention necessarily refer to and employ each 392 other, as discussed above. It is merely to say that protention bears some necessary relationship to 393 intentionality that requires further analysis before any investigation into intentionality-single or 394 double-can be said to be complete. 395
Given these two implications, it is misleading to speak of retention as doubly-intentional. 396
If one means by this that retention is the doubly-intentional act called for by Husserl to avoid 397 infinite regress and thereby ground absolute consciousness, we see immediately that this runs 398 contrary to the first implication of our analysis of protention which shows that retention and 399 protention are not acts, but are constitutive of acts. On the other hand, if one wants to use the 400 term "act" loosely here, and thereby mean only that retention is that which enables our 401 consciousness to be doubly-intentional (even if it is, properly speaking, other acts that have this 402 doubly-intentional character), we see that this too is not quite correct, as it runs contrary to the 403 second implication of our analysis of protention. In fact, if one wanted to speak loosely and 404 thereby attribute double-intentionality to either retention or protention, we see now that it seems 405 more accurate, if one is forced to choose between the two, to ascribe this doubly-intentional 406 characteristic to protention, rather than retention. 407
We can see, then, that the positive account of protention discussed in this paper helps us 408 to clarify internal time-consciousness, in general, and retention in particular. I contend that this is 409 but one area of phenomenology in which the positive account of protention would yield new 410 insights. At the very least, as this discussion has already alluded to, the analysis of the different 411 levels of consciousness, and hence the relationship between absolute consciousness and 412 empirical experience, is also affected by this account of protention. The resulting influences of 413 this would be felt in later phenomenological work, and could ripple out to such diverse fields as 414 epistemology (via Husserl's work on logic and experience), ethics (via the work of Levinas),
